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HOW A FEE PER-UNIT
GARBAGE AFFECTS AGGREGATE
RECYCLING IN A MODEL WITH
HETEROGENEOUS HOUSEHOLDS
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a utility maximizing model of household choiceamong garbage
disposal, recycling, and littering. The impact of a user fee for garbage collection is modelled for
heterogeneous households with different preferences for recycling. The model explains (1)why
somehouseholds participatein curbside recycling programs even in the absence of a user fee,
(2)whyother householdsdo notparticipate, eveninthe presence of a userfee,and (3) why
some householdschooseto litterwhenothers do not. Household choices are aggregated to
determine theeffectof a user fee onthecommunity-wide quantities of garbage, recycling, and
litter. We showhowan increase in theuserfee can decrease aggregate recycling.
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and NBER1. Introduction
Nearly2000communities have implementeduserfeestofinance garbage collectionover
the lastfIveyears,requiring householdstopay for each bag of garbagepresentedfor collection
(Skumatz 1993). The revenue raisedfromthese user fees has supplanted the use of general tax
revenueto finance garbage collection and disposal costs. Casual evidence suggests thatuser fees
are applied most predominantly in regions that have experienced large increases in disposal costs.
Benefits to the community include the social value of less garbage and more recycling. The costs
includethe social costofadditional litter and the value of resourcesused to administerthe
program. Both the benefits and costs depend on the waste removal choices of individual
households within the community.
This paper develops a model of household choice among waste removal options, with
diverse commodities and heterogeneous households. Each household compares thecost of
curbsidegarbage collection, the cost of littering, and the costofrecycling for each type of waste
material. A household thatrecycles comparesthe costoffree curbside recycling pickup withthe
costof sending used materials directly to secondary markets (bypassing curbside pickup). Thus
ourmodelisgeneralenough to encompass second-hand sales. A userfee forgarbage collection is
likelytoaffectthe choice of each householdoverwhether to discard,recycle, or litter.
Households withinthecommunity are assumed to differ over their income and preferences
for recycling. The introduction of this type of heterogeneity in our model explains (I) why some
households participate in a curbside recycling program even in the absence of a user fee, (2) why
otherhouseholdsstilldo not participateinrecyclingprograms even in the presenceofa userfee
for garbage collection, and (3) why some households choosetolitter when othersdonot.
This model has twopurposes.First, we wishto lay atheoretical foundation forfuture
empiricalwork.Thereforewenotewherethistheoretical model hasempirical implications.2
Second, we wish to think about how heterogeneous household behaviors affect aggregate
garbage, recycling, and litter, and how these aggregate outcomes affect the costs and benefits to a
community from the implementation of a user fee program. The model suggests that aggregate
garbage will decrease with the value of the user fee. Aggregate litter increases with the user fee,
but, perhaps surprisingly, aggregate recycling may decrease. The magnitude of these changes can
vary across communities. These behavioral responses must be taken into account by any local
policymaker considering a user fee for garbage collection. The consequence for empirical work,
especially the use of a cross-section of communities with different user fees, is that each
community's choice of user fee is not exogenous.
Sections 2 of this paper will introduce the model of household choice for methods of
waste removal without the option to litter. The model is expanded to include the littering option
in Section 3. Section 4 follows with a brief conclusion.
2.AModelOf Household Disposal Choice
Mostmodels of household solid waste ignore the littering option.' In an important study
for the World Resources Institute, Repetto et al (1992) claim thatany potential increases in
dumping can be alleviated by simple measures.2 To characterize these existing studies, our initial
model in this section ignores litter. Our analysis suggests that a model without the littering option
is inadequate to explain how local governments set user fees.
'For example, Jenkins (1991), Copeland (1991), Sigman (1991), Dinan (1993), Morris and
Holthausen (1994), Wertz (1976).
2They suggest locking dumpsters, vigorously publicizing and enforcing disposal rules in the
initial months of the program, reporting households that put out no garbage, and requiring a one-
bag minimum.3
2.1. Individual Behavior
Assumethat a community is comprised of heterogeneous households indexed by i =
,..,1.Each household may engage in consumption of different goods indexed by j= I,..,J. To
simplify notation throughout the paper, we use lower case letters to define variables for household
i. This convention allows us to suppress the i index. Let c, denote the consumption of good j
byhousehold i. The consumption of each good jgeneratesa certain quantity of waste material,
denoted by mj, which is assumed to be proportional to consumption.
(1)
All waste material must be either collected as garbage (with amount g,) or recycled (with
amount r). We add litter to the model in the next section. Since all matter must be removed
from the household in one form or another, we have:3
(2)
The household's total garbage and recycling are g =and r =Lr,respectively. We
use upper case letters to denote amounts aggregated over all I households, so the town's total
garbage is G =
Assumethat household is utility function is defined over its J consumption goods, the
total amount of recycling it conducts (r), and the total amount of garbage discarded by the
3Households could conceivably compost garbage or reduce the quantity of their garbage by
demanding less packaging at stores. Since these amounts are relatively small, however, we
concentrate here on the major components of the waste stream: garbage and recycling. Later we
introduce burning or dumping b.4
community (G):
(3) u u(c1, c2c, r, G)
Using a subscript to denote a first derivative, we assume that households receive positive marginal
utility from consumption (u> 0), and possibly from recycling (u ￿0),but they dislike the odor.
health problems, and environmental damage which may be associated with aggregate garbage
amounts (uG< 0).Since we assume a large number of households in the community, each
household ignores the effect of its own contribution to aggregate garbage. Households differ
over preferences for recycling: a household with a large value of u enjoys recycling more than a
household with a low value.
A potential problem with our specification is that individuals could buy more goods and
generate more waste in order to enjoy more recycling. An alternative specification could assume
disutility from generating waste (instead of utility from recycling). This alternative might have a
different effect on total consumption, but it would have the same effect on the choice between
garbage and recycling which is the focus of this paper. We cannot know why people recycle,
exactly, but perhaps the act of recycling itself makes them feel they are doing something good for
the environment.
Each household is endowed with k units of time (or other resources) that can hesupplied
to a labor market to earn a wage pk (which can vary across households), or can be used to
separate and store recyclable material. Let k denote the amount of household time supplied to
the labor market, and let k' denote the time devoted by household ito the separation of
recyclable materials. Therefore, we have:5
(4) k=k+k'.
The amount of time devoted to separating and storing recyclable materials is assumed to
be proportional to the amount of recycling conducted by the household:
(5)
Weassume that o is the same for all households and all materials (but the value of that time
varies with the wage rate, pk).4
With no city program to collect recyclable material, a household must pay to transport the
material to a recycling firm or resale market. Once there, the household either pays or receives a
price for the transfer of the material. The total out-of-pocket expenses to each household that
recycles the material of type jis,therefore, the transportation costs plus the cash payment to or
from the firm. Denote this marginal cost paid by the household as p per unit of material of type
jthatis recycled. We assume that pJ is particular to the type of material being recycled and can
take on a positive or negative value. For example, the cost to the household of transporting and
paying a firm to recycle toxic waste could be very high, while the household may be able to ii
precious metals to a recycling firm (p could be negative). For used items sold on the second
hand market, we interpret pJ to include advertising costs.
Some materials may be collected from the curb as part of a curbside recycling program.
The overall price paid by households to transport and recycle these materials will be zero. A
curbside recycling program represents an implicit subsidy to the household of sJ per unit of
4We might expect the effort expended to separate and store recyclable material would
difFer over households and material types, but making this more realistic assumption only
serves to cloud the model and adds little to our results.6
recycled material which offsets p such that the overall cost Pj -
sJ=0.The value of SI is zero
for all materials not collected at the curb.
Assume that the local government charges a user fee per unit of garbageregardlessof
the type of material. This fee is the household's only marginal cost of garbage disposal. The
household may pay property taxes or a monthly fee, but, in the absence of a user fee for garbage
collection, the price paid at the margin per bag of garbage is zero.
Household income (p"k -p1'k)can be used to purchase consumption goods at market
prices pd', to recycle material j at unit cost pJ, to pay any user fee that might be levied on
garbage, and to pay a lump sum tax t. Therefore, the budget constraint facing the household is
(6) + tg + (p-sJ)r + t =- pk(or)
where g = for household i.=ifthe recyclable material j is collected for free,and s
is zero for all other materials not collected for recycling.
Each household chooses .the amount of each consumption good, and howto dispose of it,
by maximizing utility (3) subject to (1), (2), and the budget constraint (6). A subset of the first
order conditions from this maximization are:
(7a) dLIdg: ￿ X[p+tz] for all j
(7b) dLidr1: uaj ￿ A[p+(p_sr)fopkJ -u,. for all i
where Aisthe marginal utility of income to household I. Define A' andu to be the values of
A and u,. at the solution to (7). The householdcompares the cost of garbage collection tE to
the overall marginal "cost" of recycling material j--whichis the money payment (p-sJ) plus the7
value of time (0pk) minus the value of marginal utility from recycling (u11'). These conditions
could imply a set of corner solutions. If the overall marginal "cost" of recycling a newspaper is
less than the cost of discarding it, then a household would be expected to recycle all of its
newspaper, not just some portion of it. As long asdoes not exactly equal the fill cost of
recycling (p-s) + 0pk -u1?,for some good j,thenhousehold choice between waste removal
options for that material is governed by:
r k (8a) g,=rn 1ff < (p-s) + op -u,JX
(8b) = ift'> (p,-s,) + op -u/I
The household could choose an interior solution for a good jinwhich it discards some
portion (g,) and recycles some portion (rj)ofthe material, if t =(ps,!)+opku./I.This equality
will hold only for very few materials at the knife's edge where the cost of garbage collection
exactly matches the overall marginal "cost" of recycling (including effects on time and utility).
However, the household will never choose interior solutions for two goods with different
marginal "cost". To see this, first remember that garbage and recycling are perfect substitutes in
disposal (m =g+ r) and that different materials provide equal utility from recycling (r =
Nowsuppose the householdusingboth garbage and recycling for two kinds of waste
materials with different marginal "cost" of recycling. This situation cannot be an optimal solution
because the household could switch one unit of the higher-recycling-cost waste from recycling to
garbage, and switch one unit of the lower-recycling-cost waste from garbage to recycling, while
consuming the same amount of each good, generating the same total garbage and recycling, and
saving the difference in marginal cost. Such switches would continue until the household is
5This strong theoretical result is supported by casual observation. Households who recycle
often devote space for virtually all quantities of certain materials, e.g. one bin for newspaper and
another for aluminum cans.8
discarding all materials that meet condition (8a) and recycling all that meet (8b).
Thesamemaximization provides first-order conditions for consumption, not shown, in
which the "effective"price ofconsuming good j depends on its purchase price, the relative waste
generated (mj = ajcj), and the cost of the chosen disposalmethod forthat good. Wethus capture
thepossibility that a garbage fee can discourage consumption of waste-intensive commodities.
To focus on disposal choices, in Figure 1, we assume that all types of materials can be
ranked in a descending order according to the cost of recycling (pj). For example, toxic waste
would be ranked first and precious metals last. The overall schedule of recycling costs is labeled
P' in Figure I, with material types ranked from highest cost to lowest cost from left to right.
Discrete goods (j = IJ) would generate a step function, but we show a continuous pr
schedule for ease of exposition. This schedule does not have to be linear or even differentiable, it
only has to be non-increasing.
The first order conditions indicate that the overall marginal "cost" to the household of
recycling includes the value of resources devoted to separating and storing the material of type j,
cIp, per unit, regardless of the type of material being recycled. The addition of this Cost
introduces another curve in Figure 1 higher than P' but parallel, labeled P+opk. The overall
marginal 'cost" of recycling also includes the value of the marginal utility gained by household i
from its recycling efforts, uJA". We assume that the value of themarginal utility of recycling is
also constant across materials and serves to introduce the lower overallmarginal "cost" function
parallel to the other curves, labeled MC' in Figure 1. The magnitude of the total difference
between P' and MC is unique to household i because each household hasa different value of
uJl". Let p = opku/A* be the additional cost (orbenefit) of recycling beyond p. Therefore,
the overall marginal "cost" of recycling to household i isequal to MC = P' + p per unit
recycled. This marginal cost schedule allows us to illustrate the amounts of total garbage and9
recycling chosen by the household.
According to the first-order conditions, household i can be expected to remove material
jbyusing the lowest cost alternative. Therefore, we seek the lower envelope of marginal waste
removal costs across all materials. If the per-unit cost to discard garbage is zero, Figure 1
indicates that household i will discard all materials ranked to the left of point g (where the cost
to discard garbage is less than the cost to recycle) and will recycle the remaining materials ranked
to the right of point g (and to the left of point rn).6 Without a curbside collection program for
recyclable materials, the household must transport and exchange the materials themselves. The
amounts of garbage and recycling by each household will depend on where that household's
unique MC curve intersects the horizontal axis.
Figure 1 can also be used to indicate how much garbage and recycling will be produced by
a household when a user fee for garbage collection is implemented. A user fee of 1g per bag
causes household i to decrease the amount of garbage from g to g' and to increase the material
it recycles from (m-g) to (m-g'). The magnitudes of these changes depend on the slope of the
MC curve through point g. The flatter is MCI, the cheaper it is to recycle additional materials.
The implementation of a curbside recycling program also affects the waste disposal
choices of households. Assume that the local government has agreed to collect, transport, and
recycle certain materials at no cost to the household (an implicit subsidy of = pJ). Therefore,
the overall marginal "cost" of recycling materials that are collected from the curb is only p (the
extra time 0pk minus the value of marginal utility). In the absence of a user fee for garbage
collection (t = 0), only households that like recycling (p<O) will participate in free curbside
recycling. All households with p>0 will not participate. All households might still recycle,
6The household is indifferent between discarding and recycling the material ranked exactly at
point g (at the knife's edge). If a discrete amount of some material has the household
could employ positive quantities of both methods to remove this material10
directly to secondary markets, if they receive a price such that the net cost MC' is less than the
cost of anyalternative(either 0 for garbage, or p<O for those who curbside recycle).
Figure 2 illustrates the new recycling cost schedule to the household when materials
ranked to the right of point a arecollectedfor free. The government is not willing to collect
materials ranked to the left of point a, perhaps because it costs too much to recycle these
materials.7 The P' schedule drops down to zero at point a for all materials that are collected,
and it may fall below zero later for goods that can be sold on secondary markets. The household
must still devote time to separating and storing any material it recycles, andmay receive utility
from doing so. Therefore, theoverallmarginal "cost" to the household will be represented by an
MC' curve that is flat over the range of materials that are collected for recycling.
The recycling cost function of two households in the same community, but with different
preferences for recycling, are labeled MC and MC in Figure 2. The household with MC has
greater preferences for recycling than the household facing MC Since MC lies below the P'
schedule for this household, it must have p2<O.Forthe household facing MCi, p1>0
The household with MC2' (and all other households with p<O) willparticipate in the
curbside recycling program in the absence of a user fee forgarbage collection, since the overall
marginal "cost" of recycling these items is less than zero. To see this, look for the lowerenvelope
of marginal costs in Figure 2. Household 2 discards all materials rankedto the left of g2 (point
a), recycles all materials ranked between g2 and d at the curb, and sells all materialsranked to
the right of d in secondary markets (wherepJ<O so they get paid for those materials). An
increase in the user fee t above zero would not increaserecycling for these households.
The household represented by MC (and all other households withp>0) will not recycle
7We assume that the government's decisionover which materials to collect is exogenous
to the model.11
at the curb at all as long as the cost to discard garbage is t = 0. This household discards all
materials ranked to the left of g1 (where t = 0 is less than MCi) and sells material ranked to the
right of g1 in secondary markets. In order to encourage these households to recycle at the curb,
the government must implement a garbage fee.
If t>p1 is levied on each bag of garbage collected, the household with MC will not
change its disposal behavior. It will still recycle materials ranked between g2 and d at the curb.
The household represented by MC now has the incentive to participate in the curbside recycling
program. It discards all materials ranked to the left of point a, presents material ranked between
a and d at the curb for recycling (since for those materials), and sells all material ranked
to the right of d in secondary markets. As indicated by equation (Sb),must be greater than
p to induce these households to choose to recycle these materials ranked between a and d at
the curb. Larger values of the user fee would be needed to encourage households with even
lower preferences for recycling (higher p) to recycle at the curb.
2.2. AggregateBehavior
Thepoint of the theory is to explain how a user fee for garbage collection affects the
aggregate amounts of garbage and recycling produced by a community. These aggregate curves
are obtained by summing horizontally across the garbage and recycling quantities produced by all
households in the community, for any possible value of a user fee. Aggregate curves for two
different communities are illustrated in Figure 3.
Assume that both communities have the same amount of aggregate material (M =
8A mandatory recycling law provides incentives similar to those of a user fee. For those
materials that households are required to recycle, the expected cost of discarding increases
as the expected fine for non-compliance increases or as the probability of getting caught increases.
Households with very high values of p would require a high penalty or greater enforcement to
convince them to recycle.U
todiscard and do not have curbsiderecyclingprograms. Aggregate demand for recycling in
community I is the horizontal distance from point M leftward to the curve labelled D, and
aggregate garbage is the rest of M. In the absence of a user fee for garbage collection, for
example, households in community I discard G1 in a landfill and recycle M-G1. This community
will reduce its garbage to G and increase its recycling to (M-G1)oncethe government
implements a user fee of ti'. These changes arise because all households in the community choose
to recycle more materials once a user fee is implemented (as in Figure I).
The D fi.rnction determines the aggregate quantity of garbage and recycling produced by
community 2. At any value of the user fee, this community recycles a greater quantity of material
than the first community. If a user fee with valueis levied, for example, community 2 discards
G2 and recycles (M-G). Community 2 could be comprised of more households that have strong
preferences for recycling.
Empirical observation indicates that some local governments have chosen to implement
user fees for garbage collection while most others have not. We assume that a local government
will implement a user fee if the benefits of doing so out-weigh the Costs. Since households dislike
the aggregate quantity of garbage (uG<O), important benefits are the reduction in garbage and
increase in recycling that result from the user fee. Since households in this modelengage in no
dumping, the only cost is the value of resources used to administer the user fee program.
As drawn in Figure 3, the change in garbage and recycling quantities resulting from the
implementation of a user fee is greater for community I than for community 2. The town of those
with high preferences for recycling (community 2) does not necessarily experience a large increase
in aggregate recycling due to a user fee. Households in community 2may be recycling in large
quantities before the user fee, leaving little room for additional recycling. Therefore the benefits
of implementing a user fee may be greater for community I than for community 2. Ce/ens13
parEbus,we expect communitieswithflatterDschedules (like D) to be more likely to
implementauser fee.
Why is community I more conducive to the implementation of a user fee for garbage
collection than community 2? Our model suggests that community I must be comprised of many
households that increase their recycling amounts following the implementation of a user fee.
These large increases would result if the MC schedule in Figure I is relatively flat near the
horizontal axis, and if many households in the community do not participate in the curbside
recycling program before the user fee. A flat MC schedule indicates that more materials can be
recycled at a low additional cost to the household. In the presence of a curbside recycling
program, for example, the overall marginal "cost" of recycling is fl across those materials
collected at the curb. This serves to flatten the aggregate recycling schedule. Therefore,
communities with curbside recycling may be more likely to implement a user fee.
Suppose the value of the user fee does not affect administrative costs such as advertising
the program, printing the stickers, and enforcing the law. Since the benefits of implementing the
user fee program increase with the value of the user fee, and the costs do not, this simple model
without a litter option suggests that governments would be likely to levy a very high user fee.9
For example, the government in community 1 could levy a user fee with a value of and then
collect no garbage. All materials would be recycled. Therefore, the model suggests that all
governments would either (I) not implement a user fee, if the administrative cost is greater than
the benefit of having no garbage, or (2) charge at least for each bag of garbage, if the
benefits of no garbage exceed the administrative cost of the user fee program.
Casual observations in the U.S. reject this theoretical implication. Only 2000 communities
9A user fee may change the relative price of a consumption good that is more waste intensive
than others. Therefore, another cost or benefit of implementing a user fee is this effect on
consumption.14
across the U.S. have implemented user fees for garbage collection. Most of these fees are
moderate, like $80 per bag. One explanation for the failure of this model to explain government
behavior could be that governmentsconcerned with the amount of illegal dumping that would
arise following the implementation of a user fee. A more appropriate model would include illegal
dumping as a third removal option for households. We now proceed to develop such a model.
3. TheModel With a LitteringOption
Several recent models of household solid waste behavior have considered the littering
option. Kennedy andLaplante(1994) solve for the optimal user fee given the option to litter, but
they do not consider materials with different recycling costs. Fullerton and Kinnaman
(forthcoming) allow the price of recycling to vary across goods, but treat all households as
identical. Sullivan (1987) and Dobbs (1991) also allow for litter in their models. We present the
only model to allow heterogeneous households to choose among three removal methods for
diverse types of goods.
3.1. Individual Behavior
Assume that households have the option to burn, dump, or litter garbage:
(9) m=++b
where b is the amount of burning of material jconductedby household i. Also, assume that all
households dislike the aggregate amount of burning or littering that occurs in their community:
(10) u =u(c1c5, r, G, B)15
where B = u8<O, and all other variables are defined as above.
No market or price exists for the littering or burning of garbage, but we assume that the
household must pay a fixed cost f if it engages in such practice. This fixed cost could include,
for example, the cost of finding a suitable dump site, the fixed portion of the cost of traveling to
the dumpsite, the psychic cost of breaking a local ordinance, and the risk of a fine. In other
words, dumping two bags is not twice as costly as dumping one bag, in terms of transport cost,
the risk of getting caught, and feeling bad about this antisocial behavior. Later we address the
possibility that fixed costs arise in recycling.
Littering also involves a marginal cost equal to the value of household time (kh) devoted
to burning each unit of waste material or hauling it to the illegal dump site. Assume that the
amount of time devoted to hauling such bags is proportional to the amount of burning or littering
conducted by the household:
(ii) kb=ob
where b = Then the new budget constra.t facing the household is:
(12a) pcj +tg+(pJ—sJ)r+t'=pk(kar) if b=O
(12b) +t8g+(pJ-sJ)r+f+t =
pk(kobof) ifb>O.
Household i maximizes utility (10) subject to (1), (9), and the budget constraint (12) by
choosing the amounts of consumption, garbage, recycling, and litter. First order conditions for
disposal are:16
(l3a) dL/dg: ￿A[p'+t] for allj
(13b) dL/dr):uaA[p+(pJs+opkJ-u, for allj
(13c) dL/db,: ua ￿A[p+opk] for all
where A is still the marginal utility of income to household i. Again, these results imply a set of
corner solutions if the values of the right-hand sides of(13) are not equal to each other. If the
household engages in no littering (b=O) then household behavior is described by (8a) and (8b).
With some illegal dumping (b>O), choice over methods of removing the waste material of type j
isdetermined by:
(14a) g =m1ff <MIN[(ps+opkuJA',ôp'J
(14b) rj =m,if(psJ)+opkuX <MIN[t, ôp"}
(14c) b =mj1ff ôp" <MIN[t8, (pJ-s)+op"-u!AI
where A" and u are the values of A and u evaluated at the maximum.
Household i will again choose to remove material jusingthe lowest cost alternative
(where the 'cost" of recycling includes effects on time and utility). For most materials,
households are predicted to use only one method of removal.
3.1.1.With No Curbside Recycling
'Whenwill a household pay the fixed cost associated with littering garbage? In the absence
of a curbside recycling program, the answer depends on the value of the user fee and the schedule
of recycling costs. Figure 4a illustrates the conditions that create the incentive for a household to
pay the fixed costs (f) and litter garbage. Assume, again, that we can order materials according to17
the overall marginal "cost" of recycling, MC, which includes the cost of household time spent
separating and storing material and the value of any utility received from doing so. The average
cost (ACe') and the marginal cost (MCb)ofburning or littering are also shown in Figure 4a. The
quantity of litter is measured from the origin rightward, and the quantity of recycling is still
measured from m lefIward, so the quantity of garbage is the amount in between.
If we start with a zero fee for garbage collection, the household will litter nothing, will
discard all materials ranked to the left of g,, and will supply the remaining materials (m-g,)
directly to secondary markets. These results are again determined by looking for the lower
envelope of disposal costs: the household uses t =0until g0, and then uses MC'<O). If a user
fee for garbage collection is implemented, we can find the fee Psuchthat the household is
indifferent between paying the fee for garbage vs. paying the fixed costs f and then dumping
waste illegally. Ifis below P.thenthe household will still not litter because the fixed cost of
littering is more than the money saved by not paying the user fee. If a user fee of P is charged
for each bag of garbage, the household is indiicerent between (1) putting into garbage all materials
ranked to the left of g1 and supplying all other materials to secondary markets, and (2) dumping
all materials ranked to the left of b1 and supplying the remaining materials to secondary markets.
The threshold value of the user fee (P)isfound where the total cost of option (1), denoted by the
trapezoidal area P,a,g,,0 in Figure 4a (the cost of discarding & plus the cost of recycling &-g),
is equal to the total cost of option (2), which is AC,d,c,g0,0 (the cost of burning or dumping bf
and recycling g0-bf). The household would choose the second option for any user fee with value
greater than
The information contained in Figure 4a can be captured in a another manner using Figures
4b, 4c, and 4d. Figure 4b maps the demand curve for garbage as a function of the user fee. As
stated above, the household decreases its quantity demanded for garbage collection (and increases18
recycling) as the price of garbage increases to i. Once the price of garbage exceeds this
threshold value, the quantity demanded for garbage collection falls to zero. Figure 4c maps the
cross-price relationship between the price of garbage and the quantity of recycling. Household
recycling increases with larger values of the user fee over the interval between zero andAt
this point, recycling decreases as the household begins to litter garbage. Once the fixed costs of
littering are paid, the marginal cost of littering items ranked from b1 leftward is opk, which is less
than the marginal cost of recycling them. Household recycling efforts are unresponsive to all
values of the user fee that are greater than -ft. Figure 4d illustrates the effect of the user fee on
the quantity of burning or dumping litter. No littering is conducted below the threshold value of
the user fee, but the househoid litters b for all values of the user fee that are greater than P
Several points arise from this simple model. First, the household would never
simultaneously engage in positive quantities of littering b and discarding garbage g. The
household uses garbage and recycling at low values of the user fee, and only uses dumping and
recycling at high values. Second, the househi h' will never recycle more than (m-&) for any value
of the user fee. Third, the household recycles the same materials when the value of the user fee is
equal to opk as it would for all values of the user fee that are greater than P. Therefore, a very
high user fee maybe optimal. In fact, free garbage collection may be optimal if( I) the
administrative cost of operating a user fee program is high, (2) P is relatively low, and (3) u is
large in absolute value.
Recall that p (which is equal to op-uiA') is the additional cost (or benefit) of recycling
beyond Pj The values of g,,, br, gt, and P in Figure 4a are determined by the value of p and
are, therefore, unique to each household. The values of g,,, b and g, decrease as the value of
p decreases. Households with high preferences for recycling will recycle more, discard less, and
litter less than households with low preferences for recycling. The threshold value of the user fee19
(P) increases as p decreases. Therefore, households that have higher preferences for recycling
wait for a higher value of the user fee before they are induced to litter their garbage. A decrease
in the value of p will also serve to shift the curves in Figure 4b and 4d to the left and shift the
curve in Figure 4c to the right, while at the same time raising the threshold value of the user fee.
3.1.2. With Free Recycling at the Curb
How will the implementation of a curbside recycling program influence household
response to a user fee for garbage collection? Assume that the city is willing to collect materials
ranked between point a and point m in Figure 5a, at no monetary cost to the household. Notice
that households would still sell the more valuable material toward the right, to a secondary market
rather than put to the curb for city collection. A household will respond to a user fee in one of
four ways, according to its value of p. Table I summarizes the main features of each category of
households. Preferences for recycling increase (so the value of p decreases) for higher-numbered
categories. The first category of households will never recycle at the curb, regardless of the value
of the user fee. The second and third categories of households will recycle at the curb for a
certain range of user fee, but will not recycle for values outside this range. The third category of
households will still recycle at the curb even when it engages in tittering. The fourth category of
households will recycle at the curb for all values of the user fee.
The first category of households have the lowest preference for recycling, so the value of
p is very high. Therefore, the overall marginal "cost" to recycle, denoted by MC' in Figure 5a,
is very high. In the absence of a user fee, the household discards g0 at no cost and sends (m-&)
to a secondary market. This household will sell more material in secondary markets as the value
of the user fee increases from zero, but will still not participate in a curbside recycling program.
To try to induce these households to participate in the curbside recycling program, a user fee20
would have to be implementedwitha valuegreaterthan p. However, any value of the user fee
which is greater than 1' would cause this household to pay the fixed costs and litter all materials
ranked to the left of bf. Since p>8, this household will never recycle at the curb.
Figures 5b, 5c, and 5d summarize the relationships between the value of the user fee and
the quantities of garbage (g), recycling (r), and burning (b). A small user fee will induce this kind
of household to sell more materials in secondary markets, but any user fee greater than fg will
induce this household to litter.
The second category of households have some taste for recycling, but the overall marginal
"cost" of recycling material collected at the curb (p) is greater than the marginal cost of littering
(6pk).Thishousehold wilt only recycle at the curb for specific values of the user fee. The
household will instead discard these materials if the user fee is too low (t<p) or litter them if the
user fee is too high (t>P).
Figure 6a illustrates the behavior of th category of households. In the absence of a user
fee, this category will put into garbage all materials ranked to the left of g0 and will sell the
remaining materials in secondary markets. As the value of the user fee increases from zero, the
household will gradually discard less material and recycle more. It will recycle at the curb for
values of the user fee slightly greater than p. At 1, the household is indifferent between (I)
discarding all materials ranked to the left of g, and recycling the rest (including materials g0-g1
collected at the curb), and (2) littering all materials ranked to the left of bf and sending (m-b) to
secondary markets. The total cost of method I is the area (i,a,h,c,g0,0), while that of method 2
is (AC,d,e,g0,0). The threshold value of the user fee (P) is found where these two areas are
equal. The household chooses to litter b1 for all values of t greater than t.
These results are also summarized in Figures 6b, 6c, and 6d, where quantities of garbage,
recycling, and litter are mapped over all positive values of the user fee. Figure 6b shows that, as21
the value of the user fee increases from zero, households in this category gradually reduce the
quantity of garbage. As the user fee increases above p, the household sharply reduces its
garbage and begins to recycle at the curb. Once the user fee rises above P. the household stops
discarding garbage, and, as Figure 6d illustrates, begins to litter. This response of recycling to a
user fee is somewhat surprising. The household participates in curbside recycling for values of the
user fee slightly greater than p, but it abandons its curbside recycling efforts once the user fee
exceeds P. At this high fee, the household has the incentive to pay the fixed cost f associated
with dumping. Since the marginal cost of dumping materials (ôpk) is lower than the overall
marginal "cost" of recycling them at the curb (p), the household will litter these recyclable
materials as well.
Preferences towards recycling increase or households in the third category. The only
difference between this category and the second is that the overall marginal 'cost" of recycling (p)
is now less than the marginal cost of littering those materials (óp"). However, the overall
marginal "cost" of recycling these materials is still greater than zero. Therefore, households in
this category are not expected to recycle at the curb in the absence of a user fee for garbage
collection. See Figure 7a.
With no user fee for garbage collection, households in this category discard all materials
ranked to the left of g0 and sell the rest directly to secondary markets. This household only
participates in curbside recycling for values of the user fee greater than p. More specifically, the
household will discard all materials ranked to the left of g, will recycle at the curb all materials
g-g,, and will sell the remaining m-g materials in secondary markets. The household may even
send materials ranked to the left of & to secondary markets if the value of the user fee exceeds22
the MC' at gt (callitMC).'°Thesematerials ranked to the left of & are not collected for free
by the city. If the value of the user fee exceeds the threshold value ofthehousehold begins to
litter. However, contrary to households in category 2, households in category 3 will only litter
materials ranked to the left of & (once they have paid the fixed costs of dumping), and they will
still participate in the curbside recycling program for materials ranked between & and g. These
households still recycle at the curb for very high values of t' because the marginal cost of
dumping those materials (ôp") is greater than the overall marginal "cost" of recycling them (p).
The behavior of households in this category is also summarized in Figures 7b, 7c, and 7d.
The only difference between these figures and those presented for households in category 2 is
that, as the value of the user fee exceeds P, tse households will still recycle all materials
collected at the curb instead of littering them.
Households in category 4 have p<O and thus will recycle at the curb even in the absence
of a user fee. The logic can be seen in Figure 8a. The overall marginal 'cost" to recycle materials
collected at the curb (p) is less than zero, the marginal cost of discarding garbage in the absence
of a user fee. The household discards all materials to the left of g and participates in curbside
recycling in the absence of a user fee. Therefore, the implementation of a user fee for garbage
collection will have no impact on this household's curbside recycling level until the value of the
user fee is very large. User fees greater than MC' at point g0 (call it MC) will induce this
household to send more materials ranked to the left of g, to secondary markets (paying p'>O).'1
However, if the value of the user fee exceeds P, the household begins to litter all material ranked
'°This result depends on whether the MC' function and the ACb function cross above
or below point MC. Figure 7a is drawn with those functions crossing above MC. If these
lines cross below this point, no additional recycling will take place.
"As described in the preceding footnote, this result depends on whether the MC' and AC"
cross at a point above or below MC.23
to the left of g0 (at marginal cost ôp") and recycle the rest.
Figures 8b, 8c, and 8d summarize these results.Noticein Figure 8c that the amount of
recycling conducted by these households is fairly unresponsive to price. In fact, the only major
change in waste removal methods attributed to a change in the user fee is a switch from discarding
garbage (g) to burning or littering (b). This switch occurs for values of the user fee greater than
is• This result suggests that garbage fees would have little success in increasing the recycling
levels of households who have rather strong preferences for recycling. These households already
participate in the curbside recycling program in the absence of a user fee, leaving little room to
increase their recycling quantities following the implementation of the user fee.'1
3.2. Aggregate Behavior
Thecommunity's demand schedule for garbage collection can be derived by adding
horizontally the amounts of garbage thrown out by all households in the community, at each value
of the user fee. Individual garbage quantities with curbside recycling are depicted in Figures Sb
through 8b, where all types of households either reduce or leave unchanged their garbage
quantities with increases in the value of the user fee. A higher user fee never increases the
quantity of garbage. Therefore, aggregate garbage never increases with the user fee.
Similarly, Figures (Sd) through (8d) illustrate that increasing values of the user fee either
increase or leave unchanged amounts of litter for all households. Therefore, the aggregation of
household litter must either increase or remain unchanged with higher values of the user fee.
Aggregate litter will never decrease.
The same story cannot be told for aggregate recycling levels. One might expect that
12A possible fifth category of households will never litter garbage. The overall marginal
'cost" of recycling even the most expensive items (the whole MC schedule) is less than
the cost of burning or littering (the ACb schedule).24
aggregate recycling would increase with higher values of the user fee, and this result certainly
holds for some households over some ranges of the user fee. However, Figures (5c) through (8c)
indicate that i! categories of households reduce recycling over some range of the user fee.
Different households will decrease recycling by different amounts, and over different ranges of t.
Therefore, the horizontal aggregation of recycling across all households could either rise or fall
with increasing values of the user fee.
The logic is a bit different for each category of households, but increases inwill
eventually induce all households to pay the fixed cost and begin to litter waste material. Once
these fixed costs are paid, the household may find the marginal cost of dumping (ôp1') to be less
than the overall marginal "cost" of recycling (C'). At this point, a higher value of t induces
less recycling.
The relationships between the user fee and these aggregate amounts are illustrated in
Figure 9 for two specific communities. The function for community I (call it D) is drawn so that
aggregate recycling (measured from the point M leftward) rises with the user fee. The litter
function for community I (call itD) reflects the fact that some households, perhaps in category
I, litter garbage even at very low values of the user fee. As the user fee increases from zero,
more households are predicted to pay the fixed cost associated with littering and contribute to
aggregate litter.
If no user fee is charged for garbage, the community with recycling fi.inction D and
littering function D litters an amount B1 =0,recycles M-G1, and discards G1. As long as the
marginal cost of littering is positive and the marginal cost to discard garbage is zero, then all
communities experience no litter in the absence of a user fee. Once a user fee of t8 is levied, the
amount of litter increases to B1', the amount of recycling increases to M-G, and the amount of
garbage decreases to G-B.25
These functions for a second community are denoted by D and D. With user fee
community2 increases litter from B2 to B, increases recycling from M-G2 to M-G and
reduces the level of garbage from G2-B2 to G-B. Notice that the increase in litter is smaller
than experienced by community .Asdrawn, the change in recycling for community 2 is larger
than for community I. Therefore, community 2 may realize greater benefits and lower costs from
the implementation of a user fee.'3
4. Implications and Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the literature on user fees for garbage collection in several
ways. We introduced heterogeneity into a model of household choice over garbage removal
methods. This model explained (I) why some households participate in curbside recycling
programs in the absence of a user fee, (2) why other households do not recycle at the curb even in
the presence of a user fee, and (3) why some households choose to litter garbage when others do
not. We aggregated diverse households in each community to provide a prediction that a user fee
will never increase garbage, and will never decrease illicit burning or dumping. At some point,
however, the garbage fee becomes high enough to induce some people to pay the fixed cost of
dumping and thus to switch away from recycling. As a consequence, the garbage fee might
decrease aggregate recycling.
The model is general enough to encompass fixed costs for recycling instead of for
dumping. Individuals and recycling firms may incur search and transport costs that do not vary
with the amount recycled. If so, the same model could be employed to show that a rising garbage
fee would generate monotonic decreases in garbage and monotonic increases in recycling. At
'3The model does not suggest that the community with less littering will also experience
a greater change in recycling (as drawn in Figure 9). This community could experience a
smaller change in recycling.26
somepoint, however, the garbage fee wouldbecome highenough to induce some people to pay
the fixed cost of recycling and thus to switch away from dumping. As a consequence, the garbage
fee might decrease aggregate dumping.
We now return to the two purposes outlined in our introduction. First, we wished to lay a
theoretical foundation for future empirical work. What we found is that the observed low or
moderate garbage fees cannot be explained in a model where households cannot burn, dump, or
litter. Therefore, we added this option to the 'del. We described four types of households, and
we aggregated individual behavior to find community demands. We found that individual
behavior, and thus aggregate demands, depend upon (I) the community's distribution of
household preferences for recycling, (2) the fixed costs associated with dumping. (3) the
distribution of income in the community, (4)theprice of recyclable materials, and (5)thepresence
of curbside recycling. Therefore, empirical work will require measures of those variables.
The theory also makes some specific predictions that can be tested empirically In general,
the own-price elasticity for garbage should be non-positive. The cross-price effect of the garbage
fee on recycling quantities could be negative or positive at high values of the garbage fee (where it
could induce people to pay the fixed cost of dumping and thus to switch out of recycling), but it
should be non-negative at low values of the user fee.
Second, we wished to think about how these aggregate outcomes affect the costs and
benefits to a community from the implementation of a user fee program. In particular, the
heterogeneity of households implies that some communities will respond more than others. Thus
a user fee is more likely to be adopted in communities with low administrative costs,large
increases in recycling, and small increases in dumping. The important implication for empirical
work is that the town's choice of user fee is not exogenous.References
Copeland, Brian R., "International Trade in Waste Products in the Presence of Illegal Disposal,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20 (1991): 143-62.
Dinan, Terry M., "Economic Efficiency Effects of Alternate Policies for Reducing Waste
Disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25 (1993): 242-56.
Dobbs, Ian M., "Litter and Waste Managemer Disposal Taxes versus User Charges,' Canadian
Journal of Economics 24 (1991): 221-7.
Fullerton, Don and Kinnaman, Thomas C., "Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (forthcoming).
Jenkins, Robin, "Municipal Demand for Solid Waste Disposal Services: The Impact of User
Fees," mimeo, University of Maryland (1991).
Kennedy, Peter W., and Laplante, Benoit, "Municipal Solid Waste Management: The Optimal
Pricing of Garbage and Recyclables Collection," mimeo, World Bank (1994).
Moms Glenn E. and Holthausen, D. M., "The Economics of Household Solid Waste Generation
and Disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26(1994).
Repetto, Robert, Dower, Roger C., Jenkins, Robin, and Geoghegan, Jacqueline, Green Fees: How
a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Economy, Washington DC: World Resource
Institute (1992).
Skumatz, Lisa A., "Variable Rates for Municipal Solid Waste: Implementation Experience,
Economics, and Legislation," Policy Study No. 160, Reason Foundation (1993).
Sigman, Hillary, "A Comparison of Public Policies for Lead Recycling," mimeo, UCLA
Department of Economics (1991).
Sullivan, Arthur M., "Policy Options for Toxic Disposal: Laissez-faire, Subsidization, and
Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14 (1987): 58-71.
Wertz, Kenneth L., "Economic Factors Influencing Households' Production of Reftise," Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 2 (1976): 263-72.</ref_section>TABLI I 
A Summary of the Four Categories of Households 
Category  Feature  Value of p 
When  = 0  Values of i that 
encourage participation 
i.  recycling  Curbside Recycling? 
I  Never participates in the curbside 
recycling program.  p> t'  No  None 
2  Litters materials collected for recycling 
at high values of t.  < p <t  No  p <t  < t 
3  Participates in curbside recycling  for all 
values of the user Ice greater than p.  0 < p < ôp  No  p < 
4  Participates in curbside recycling for all 
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